



SCHOOL CHILDREN FROM AN INTEGRATED ISLAMIYYAH SCHOOL IN SAMARU, ZARIA
JAMILU MUSA

AFFORDABLE NON-STATE SCHOOLS IN KADUNA STATE, NIGERIA

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CONTENTS

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	4
II. INTRODUCTION	9
III. METHODOLOGY	11
IV. CONTEXT	14
V. MAPPING	19
VI. FINDINGS	26
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS	36
VIII. REFERENCES	38
IX. ANNEX	42

ABBREVIATIONS

ANSS	affordable non-state school
APS	affordable private school
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DFID	UK Department for International Development
ECCN	Education in Conflict and Crisis Network
EFA	Education for All
ESSPIN	Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria
GDP	Gross domestic product
GHSP	General Household Survey Panel
IDP	internally displaced persons
IMN	Islamic Movement of Nigeria
IQTE	Islamiyyah, Qur'anic, and Tsangaya
LGA	local government area
NCE	Nigeria Certificate in Education
PPP	public-private partnership
PSB	Private Sector Board
PTA	parent-teacher association
PTR	pupil-teacher ratio
SAME	State Agency for Mass Literacy
SMoE	State Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology
SUBEB	State Universal Basic Education Board
UBE	Universal Basic Education
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It is estimated that 42 percent of all primary-age children in Nigeria, around 10.5 million, are out of school (UNICEF, 2017). Of these children, the majority live in the north of the country and more than four in five receive some kind of Islamic religious education (Antoninis, 2014). These religious institutions are often informal in nature, organized by the community, and operate independently from the state education system. To increase access to basic education and to lower the number children considered out of school, the Government of Nigeria has sought to integrate these religious institutions into the state system. Yet, despite gains in access, challenges in providing quality education remain. A chronic state of conflict pervades the northern zones of Nigeria, exacerbating the challenge of providing quality education for all: between 2009 and 2015, attacks in northeastern Nigeria destroyed more than 910 schools and forced at least 1,500 to close (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

This study, performed by Results for Development (R4D), with support from USAID Education in Conflict and Crisis Network (ECCN), examines the role of affordable non-state schools (ANSS) in providing access to a quality education in Kaduna State, Nigeria, with a focus on basic education. In this report, ANSS are defined as formal and non-formal education institutions that are owned or operated by non-state entities, such as private citizens, faith-based organizations, or NGOs, and that target lower-income or marginalized populations. This case study is part of a broader research engagement with USAID around the role of non-state education in conflict and crisis contexts that also includes (1) a global review of literature on non-state education and conflict and crisis, (2) the development of a conceptual framework, and (3) a case study of El Salvador.

Kaduna State was selected as the second case study by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for several reasons, including the application of lessons from Kaduna with the experiences of other conflict-affected countries that have a rich history of Islamic education, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Somalia. Like Kaduna State, these countries have large Islamic ANSS systems that have considerable influence on the access and quality of basic education. While there have been studies that investigated Islamic non-state schools as they related to equity, quality, and access, little is known specifically about how these schools are affected by and respond to conflict.

This case study (1) explores the context of conflict and crisis in Kaduna; (2) maps the landscape of non-state schools; and (3) investigates how non-state education and conflict affect education quality, access, holistic well-being, finance, and sustainability. Findings from the study informed the recommendations for donor and government engagement with non-state schools in Kaduna State, Nigeria.

CONTEXT OF VIOLENCE

The nature of conflict and violence in Kaduna is complex and multifaceted. It includes political, religious, communal, gender, tribal, and ethnic-based violence (Coinco, 2014). These forms of violence often overlap and rarely occur in isolation. Political violence can ignite long-standing religious and communal conflicts, which can then lead to violent conflicts. For example, after the presidential election in 2011, riots that started in Kafanchan and Zaria rapidly deteriorated from political conflict to a widespread, violent religious conflict resulting in casualties, deaths, and the destruction and loss of houses and businesses (Coinco, 2014). These forms of violence in Kaduna can be traced to a historic struggle for political representation and access to resources, land, and livelihood among the various ethno-religious communities.

Clashes between farmers and herdsmen over land and livelihood, for example, are based on a deep-rooted mistrust along tribal and religious lines. Attacks by Fulani herdsmen (who are mainly Muslim) on farming communities (which are mostly Christian) and their subsequent reprisals have ravaged Southern Kaduna. The conflict has worsened as more cattle herders move south, often entering farming land. Farmers accuse the Fulani herdsmen of allowing their cattle to trample and eat their crops, while Fulani cattle herders in turn accuse farmers of killing their cattle (SBM Intelligence, 2017). It is important to note that this herder-farmer conflict pervades Northern Nigeria and is not exclusive to Kaduna State (DFID, 2016).

Religious violence in Kaduna extends beyond Muslim and Christians. A recent clash between the military and the Shiite Islamic group in Zaria, Kaduna, resulted in the death of a Shiite leader's three sons. This event has brought the fear of revenge attacks and uncertainty to the community (Coinco, 2014).

Education in Kaduna takes place within this complex state of conflict, and as a representation of the cultural profile of the community, schools are at the center—or caught in the crossfire—of conflict.

The immediate impact of conflict on education includes, but is not limited to, destruction or damage of school infrastructure, school closure, and the use of schools to accommodate internally displaced people (IDP). The long-term impact of violence on education includes migration of teachers to safer communities, increased school dropouts, and segregation of schooling along tribal and religious lines.

MAPPING

In Kaduna, non-state schools fall into three broad categories: Non-Islamic (usually Christian-based), Islamic, and integrated-Islamic schools. Non-Islamic schools can be secular or Christian-based. Christian missionary schools provided much of the first “formal” education available in Nigeria during the colonization period and in Kaduna. Government officials estimate that Christian schools represent the majority of the non-Islamic non-state schools.

The World Bank estimates that private schools account for 15 percent of primary and lower secondary enrollment in Kaduna State, with religious schools accounting for 3 percent of enrollment (World Bank, 2014). However, the distinction between private and religious schools is blurred in Kaduna State. Conventional “low-fee private schools” that are common in Lagos and other parts of Southern Nigeria are mostly absent in Kaduna. Non-state schools are predominantly religiously affiliated, and formal religiously affiliated non-state schools that incorporate the basic education curriculum are considered private by the Kaduna State government. There is no comprehensive dataset that estimates the prevalence of the different types of non-state schools, making it extremely difficult to assess the exact size of the non-state education sector.

Kaduna State has two main types of Islamic schools: *Islamiyyah* and *Tsangaya* schools. The archetype of traditional Islamic education, *Tsangaya* schools are non-formal education institutions that revolve around the Ma'alam, a spiritual teacher who travels from place to place with a few students (Solomon, 2015). At these schools, children are taught to memorize the Qur'an through a combination of recitation and copying activities. Secular subjects are not taught. Despite their limitations, *Tsangayas* remain popular among low-income groups, and it is estimated that four-fifths of the proportion of Nigeria's out-of-school children attend some form of religious education, including *Tsangaya* schools.

Unlike Tsangayas, Islamiyyah schools follow a formal structure in terms of time schedules and approaches to teaching. Islamiyyah schools offer structured lessons on interpreting the Qur'an and a discussion of key Islamic themes that provide more than just basic memorization of verses. Islamiyyah schools are private and owned by individuals or communities. Non-integrated Islamiyyah schools do not teach subjects from the national education curriculum.

Integrated-Islamic schools are Islamiyyah or Tsangaya schools that incorporate the national education curriculum. There are more integrated-Islamiyyah schools than integrated-Tsangaya schools and there have been and continues to be efforts supported by government and donors to expand the integration of Tsangayas into the formal sector.

FINDINGS

Although state authorities in Kaduna recognize the complementary role of non-state schools, our analysis found that they are largely unaware of the specific needs and conditions of non-state schools. This is partly due to the lack of robust data available, which is a product of the government's modest ability to track the number of registered schools. Government officials estimate there are an additional 2,000 unregistered non-state schools in Kaduna that operate in isolation of the government.

This study also found that **state policies on registration, accreditation, and taxation of non-state schools are unclear and burdensome.** All three registered schools in our sample explained that the various government levies placed on non-state schools were a burden on their finances. The annual re-accreditation fee, for example, ranges from \$97 to more than \$556. Such fees are extremely taxing for non-state schools that already face significant financial constraints. For some schools, it is better to operate independently and forgo taxes rather than register with the government.

Affordable non-state schools are not profit-driven and are often not profitable. Financial sustainability is jeopardized by low and variable revenue flows. All sampled schools were established with a social, not-for-profit mission. While system-level data on school profitability was not available, school directors explained that their schools were not profitable.

However, **non-state schools are deeply rooted in their local communities with parents, teachers, and school head teachers extensively involved in ensuring the well-being of schools.** Community donations, either financial or in-kind, are critical sources of support for non-state schools. Head teachers of Islamiyyah schools describe how their schools are highly dependent on the donations received as part of the *Jummat* or *Sallat* Islamic tradition of social contributions.

Reflecting the localized and faith-based nature of non-state schools, their student bodies are largely of the same religion or tribe. Although non-state schools do not actively set entry requirements to children from different ethnic or religious backgrounds, the self-selection bias of parents tends to lead to student bodies that are not inclusive. Conflict can perpetuate the homogeneity of non-state schools as students, parents, and teachers of different religions or tribes relocate away from violent-torn locations.

At the same time, **non-state schools are somewhat insulated from conflict and can respond proactively to imminent violence because they are rooted in their community network.** Islamic non-state schools that are endorsed by local religious leaders enjoy an added level of respect and legitimacy that can protect them from violence. These leaders are able to alarm schools of imminent conflict, which allows schools to plan and prepare for violence.

Enrollment in ANSS is also driven by the perceived quality of a values education offered. Parents who send their children to Islamic non-state schools disclosed that their primary motivation for doing so was because the school provides an Islamic education. This affiliation to religious teaching is closely linked to the desire for a values education, where children are taught discipline and respect for elders and are given lessons on proper ethics.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of common-sense reforms and interventions could improve the quality of education offered by non-state schools, without necessarily diverting resources from public to private schools. Additionally, there are modalities through which investment in non-state schools could augment resilience to violence and access to education. Based on the full set of findings from this study, we present several recommendations for action that government and donors could take to support the Kaduna State education system. These recommendations have at their foundation an understanding that a large proportion of non-state schools serve low-income populations, and private and public sectors are inexorably interrelated, face similar challenges, and would benefit from closer collaboration.

The **Kaduna State Ministry of Education should conduct regular surveys and needs assessments of non-state schools to be more aware of their status and understand their exact needs and challenges.** To strengthen the capacity for evidence-based decisionmaking, data quality needs to be drastically improved, planned surveys need to be funded, and needs assessments need to be conducted to help identify the bottlenecks that non-state schools face, particularly in contexts of conflict.

The Ministry of Education should also seek to improve the operational environment of ANSS. They can achieve this by **introducing clear and streamlined criteria and processes for registering, accrediting, and regulating non-state schools.** Regulation of non-state schools should be systematic, and quality indicators should be objective and measurable so as to minimize discretion and limit the scope for corruption. **The Ministry should also reduce the tax burden on non-state schools.** All accredited non-state schools in Kaduna are subject to multiple taxes that exacerbate financial fragility and stifle growth. Government goals for educating children would be better served by collecting revenue from other sources, not schools. Instead of harsh taxation, **the ministry could also consider incentives and subsidies for certain non-state schools.** The government could support non-state schools by (1) allowing private schools teachers no-cost access to in-service trainings at national teacher colleges, (2) expanding the government school feeding program mandate to non-state schools, (3) providing government standard textbooks and other teaching and learning materials, and (4) paying for teacher positions in schools serving low-income populations or operating in violence-affected areas.

Finally, **the ministry of education should strongly commit to the integration of basic education curriculum in Islamic non-state schools.** This study found no evidence to suggest Islamic non-state schools are opposed to the integration of a basic education curriculum. The government, therefore, has an opportunity to build on this sensitization by sustaining integration programs initiated by donors and paying the salaries of state teachers currently integrated in non-state schools.

Donors should adjust their sector engagement strategies to pay more attention to non-state schools or to at least recognize the vital role that they play. Given the prevalence of non-state schools, any strategy that does not acknowledge that reality is incomplete. Donor activities should explore engagements with non-state schools as a means of building resilience and peace and supporting marginalized communities. Engagements could include providing state teachers to non-state schools to teach the basic education curriculum. Research on state education should also take into account non-state schools, as these schools form an important part of the sector.

Donors should also assist the Kaduna State government to clarify their policies toward non-state schools. Successful design and implementation of policies toward the non-state sector needs to ensure that the government agency responsible for regulating the private sector has both the information and the skills required to create, develop, and manage functions, such as institutional accreditation and registration, quality assurance processes, and monitoring. Donors can play an important, complementary role in supporting government to develop data-driven policies toward non-state schools and help create enabling and balanced regulatory frameworks. One specific way donors can support the government is to **fund surveys and censuses on non-state schools.**

II. INTRODUCTION

As a state that has shown strong commitment to engaging with Islamic non-state schools, Kaduna represents a valuable case study for better understanding the implications and lessons from governmental attempts to partner with the non-state sector in conflict-affected contexts. While there have been studies that investigate Islamic non-state schools as it relates to equity, quality, and access, very little is known specifically about how these schools are affected by and respond to conflict.

Therefore, the USAID Education in Conflict and Crisis Network (ECCN) contracted with Results for Development (R4D) to study the role of affordable non-state schools (ANSS) in Kaduna State, Nigeria, and to provide considerations on when and how governments and donors might engage with ANSS in Kaduna.

Studying these topics are important for a few reasons. First, of the 10.5 million children classified as out of school in Nigeria, four-fifths receive some kind of religious education from Islamic non-state education providers (Antoninis, 2014). Because these institutions do not follow the national basic education curriculum, children that attend these schools are officially considered out of school. Kaduna State's strategy of integrating basic education curriculum into religious schools offers insights for other governments seeking to provide poor and marginalized children with a quality education.

Second, Kaduna state has also been subject to various forms of violent conflict. Although Kaduna has not been the epicenter of Boko Haram's violent extremism, it has been subject to Boko Haram attacks in northern and southern local government areas (LGAs). Kaduna has also received internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing from violence further north (Musa, 2017). Recent violence from pastoralists directed at farming communities has further exacerbated insecurity. Kaduna state has a history of ethno-religious conflict rooted in the struggle for political representation, land, livelihood, and power (SBM Intelligence, 2017).

This backdrop of terrorism, violence, and insecurity has contributed to an environment of fear and distrust, complicated by religious overtones. Insecurity and displacement affects households' access to education and trust in state and community actors and the willingness of parents to send children to school. These dynamics are further complicated by the fact that non-state education in Kaduna is principally religious in nature.

The combination of Kaduna's expansive, and principally religious, non-state sector and the specter of various forms of violent conflict provides an opportunity for understanding the interplay between conflict, non-state schools, and government cooperation. This study is particularly relevant for other regions that have a strong and rich history of Islamic education, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Somalia. Like Kaduna State, these countries have large Islamic ANSS systems that have considerable influence on the access to and quality of basic education.

This case study is part of a broader research engagement with USAID around the role of non-state education in conflict and crisis contexts that also includes (1) a global review of literature on non-state education and conflict and crisis, (2) the development of a conceptual framework, and (3) a case study of El Salvador. This broader research engagement is focused around eight key research questions:

1. What are the unique features of a crisis and conflict context that might impact the education sector, and within that, the ANSS sector in particular?
2. What is a conceptual framework that describes the key considerations regarding whether and how ANSS can play a viable role within the education sector in situations of crisis and conflict?¹
3. What are the major constraints and opportunities that ANSS face in contexts of crisis and conflict?
4. What role could ANSS play in conflict and crisis contexts, particularly in rebuilding the country's education system?
5. What role must the host-country government play in ANSS in crisis and conflict-affected countries?
6. To what extent do ANSS promote equitable access, holistic well-being, sustainability and social cohesion relative to public schools within the context of crisis and conflict?
7. What are the prerequisites that must be in place within the crisis and conflict-affected countries to ensure sustainable investments in ANSS?
8. Are there exemplary ANSS models that provide insight on how donors and governments can best leverage and capitalize on ANSS in crisis and conflict-affected countries?

The objectives of this study are to (1) map the non-state education sector in Kaduna; (2) identify and develop profiles of select affordable non-state school types; (3) investigate the degree to which non-state schools provide quality, accessible, affordable, and sustainable education in a context of conflict; and (4) propose considerations for the government and donors on how they may support and partner with the non-state sector to deliver conflict sensitive, quality education services to the poor, marginalized and hard-to-reach populations.

This study is organized into seven sections: (1) executive summary, (2) introduction, (3) the methodology for this research, (4) context, (5) the mapping of the non-state education sector, (6) findings, and (7) recommendations.

¹ The conceptual framework developed for this study is included in the main report, "Affordable Non-State Schools in Contexts of Crisis and Conflict."

III. METHODOLOGY

To achieve the objectives of the case study, primary data were collected through school visits and key informant interviews. Academic, policy, government, and donor reports were collected as secondary data. Data on the education system, including the public and private sectors, were also collected. Details on the school selection criteria, structure of the focus group discussions, and limitations of our methodology are presented in the subsections below.

ANSS SELECTION

A purposive sampling strategy was applied based on three guiding principles: affordability, location, and diversity in provider type.

We adopted a school fee threshold based on methods proposed by Barakat et al. (2012) to identify affordable schools. Using Barakat et al.'s (2012) assumption that a family can affordably spend 4 percent of its household income to educate one child without making significant sacrifices in other areas, we found that a family at the poverty line (earning \$1.90 a day) could reasonably afford a monthly fee of \$9.24 per child. We used this threshold to identify non-state schools in our sample. Six of the nine sampled schools had monthly fees below or at the \$9.24 term threshold. The three schools with fees slightly above this threshold were included to provide variance in our sample. Elite and high-fee schools were not included.

Because Kaduna had no incidence of specific conflict or violence data, the research team relied on local knowledge to sample schools from three different LGAs that had been affected by violence, skirmishes, or conflict. Zaria, for example, has a history of political and religious violence (SBM Intelligence, 2017). In 2015, the Human Rights Watch reported that at least 300 people were killed in clashes between the Nigerian Army and the Shiite group (Human Rights Watch, 2015). According to the BBC, the deaths were in retaliation for the Shia minority group the Islamic Movement of Nigeria's (IMN's) attempt to assassinate army chief Gen Tukur Buratai (BBC, 2016). The IMN is backed by Shia-dominated Iran and has a history of clashes with government security forces. Also, the last three decades has seen the Southern LGA of Jemma'a, a predominantly Christian area, riven by conflict between the Muslim, primarily the Hausa-speaking Fulani cattle drivers, and the mainly Christian farmers.

Finally, schools were sampled from the three provider types that are most widespread in Kaduna. Only schools that had an explicit focus on serving low-income or marginalized populations were sampled. Table I describes the selected schools after using the above criteria.

TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLED SCHOOLS

	OWNERSHIP	ENROLLMENT	FEES	LOCATION
1	Integrated Islamiyyah ²	200–300	Term: \$7.50	Zaria
2	Integrated Islamiyyah	50–60	Term: \$0.80–\$1.40	Jemma'a
3	Integrated Islamiyyah	360	Term: \$19	Kaduna North LGA
4	Non-integrated Tsangaya ³	50	Annual: \$0.15	Zaria
5	Integrated Tsangaya	170–200	Monthly: \$0.15	Zaria
6	Integrated Tsangaya	50–60	Term: \$0.30	Jemma'a
7	Integrated Tsangaya	300	No fees	Kaduna South LGA
8	Christian	90–100	Term: \$13.90	Jemma'a
9	Christian	400–500	Term: \$34.70	Kaduna North LGA

Source: Authors' analysis

INTERVIEWS

Each school visit consisted of an interview with the school head teacher, a focus group of four to eight teachers, and a focus group of five to eight parents. The school head teacher selected parent and teacher participants, meaning that the selection was non-random and potentially not representative. A total of 159 individuals participated in interviews or focus groups held during school visits over the course of the study.⁴ General school conditions were also observed during the school visits.

Interviews were also held with individuals from a wide variety of organizations that work directly or indirectly with non-state schools or with the education sector in general. In total, 18 informants from government, donor agencies, and civil society organizations were included in individual or group interviews.

LIMITATIONS

The following limitations should be taken into account when considering this study's findings.

The lack of conflict-prevalence data prevented the team from sampling schools from areas that are the most conflict-affected. Instead, the team used a purposeful sampling strategy based on local knowledge to select schools from areas known to be conflict-affected. Therefore, selected schools are not fully

² Integrated Islamiyyah schools teach basic education and Islamic curriculums and are described in greater detail in section V.

³ Tsangayas are non-formal schools that only teach the memorization of the Qur'an. They are described in greater detail in section V.

⁴ Interview protocols used in school visits are available upon request.

representative of all ANSS in Kaduna State, nor are they representative of all schools affected by conflict.

The selection of teachers and parents for focus groups was not random as participants were chosen by the school head teacher. These groups, therefore, are not representative and are biased. Parents who do not send their children to private schools were not included in the sample. Data therefore are not available regarding the perceptions of caregivers outside of private schools.

Because of budget and time constraints, comparable public schools were not visited as part of the study. Any comparison between private and public schools is based on existing literature, perceptions of participants, or views of experts.

Finally, it is important to note that the scope of this study focuses on basic education (primary to lower secondary). Findings from this study may not be applicable to early childhood, pre-primary, upper secondary, or tertiary education.

IV. CONTEXT

Kaduna State, located in the northwest geopolitical zone of Nigeria, has a mix of ethnic groups, including Hausas, Fulani, Jaba, Kataf, and Bajju among others (Akuto, 2009). Islam and Christianity are the predominant religions of the region. Kaduna has a population of 8 million, of which 57 percent are under the age of 19 (Kaduna State Bureau of Statistics, 2015).

Despite its rich culture, history, and potential for economic growth, human development indicators in Kaduna are low. Life expectancy is at 44 years. The infant mortality rate is 89 per 1,000 live births and the maternal mortality rate is 576 per 100,000 births. Fifty-eight percent of children under five are underweight, and only 52.4 percent of households have access to an improved water source. Only 26.6 percent of the population have access to improved sanitation (Kaduna State Ministry of Budget and Planning, 2016).

Kaduna State remains poor, particularly in rural areas. The Kaduna State Bureau of Statistics (Kaduna State General Household Report, 2015) estimates that 61 percent of the population live in absolute poverty. Households with total monthly incomes below the cost of a basket of basic goods are considered to be in absolute poverty. A second measurement of poverty is defined by reference to the living standards of the majority in a given society. Households with expenditures lower than the total household per capita expenditure are considered relatively poor. Table 2 presents the proportion of households living below the absolute and relative poverty lines for Kaduna, as well as the relevant geopolitical zones for comparison.

TABLE 2: POVERTY IN NIGERIA

	KADUNA	NORTH EAST	NORTH WEST	NORTH CENTRAL	SOUTH WEST
% living in absolute poverty	61.5	69	70	59.5	49.8
% living in relative poverty	73	76.3	77.7	40.5	50.2

Source: *Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010 Report*

The following sections outline the context in which non-state schools operate, including the education system, the context of conflict in Kaduna, and the way in which violence and insecurity adversely affect the education system.

EDUCATION SYSTEM

The formal education system of Kaduna is regulated by the State Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (SMoE). Various aspects of education delivery and implementation are devolved to government agencies. Of these, the State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB) plays a key role in supporting primary schools and implementing the Universal Basic Education (UBE) and Education for All (EFA) programs. The formal education system has five levels: early childhood, preschool, elementary, secondary, and higher education. Public and private providers exist for all of these levels. Table 3 describes the characteristics of each level of formal education.

Over the past years, Kaduna has made impressive strides in improving enrollment at the primary level. The gross enrollment rate has increased from 79 percent in 2011 to 104 percent in 2015. However, only 57 percent of students manage to complete primary schooling—a completion rate much lower than the nation average of 73 percent (Kaduna State Bureau of Statistics, 2016). The completion rate for junior secondary is even lower at 41 percent. By age 15, the official exit age for junior secondary school, 33 percent of children are unable to read a sentence and almost a third cannot perform subtraction (Kaduna State Planning and Budget Commission, 2016). This suggests that students are not learning basic literacy and numeracy skills in school, or they lose those skills as they grow up or drop out.

TABLE 3: DESCRIPTION OF FORMAL EDUCATION LEVELS

LEVELS	NORMATIVE ATTENDANCE AGE	GRADES
Early Childhood	0–3	-
Pre-primary	3–5	Three years of pre-primary
Primary	6–11	First to sixth grades
Junior secondary	12–14	Seventh to ninth grades
Senior secondary	15–17	Ninth to 12th grades
Tertiary	18 and above	Bachelor’s and masters’ degrees

Source: Kaduna State Commissioner for Education, 2009–2020

EDUCATION FINANCE

The Kaduna State education budget has increased over the past few years, from \$66 million in 2011 to \$84 million in 2013 to \$124 million for 2017 (Kaduna State Government, 2014; Kaduna State Government, 2016a). In 2014, the state government allocated 37 percent of spending on personnel. Nineteen percent of the total state budget went to education, of which 50 percent was allocated to primary education.

The education sector receives funding from the federal, state, and local government allocations (World Bank, 2014). Local government sources are used to fund primary school teachers and non-teaching staff salaries. The funds are deducted directly from the state joint account and transferred to the SUBEB for forward payment to teachers. State sources are used to fund the staff salaries and running costs of the various education departments and agencies, sector capital projects across the state, and teachers’ salaries (except for the primary schools). This funding source is known to have problems with timely access and release of funds, which has affected sector performance (World Bank, 2014).

TABLE 4: KEY EDUCATION INDICATORS, 2015

KEY EDUCATION INDICATOR	PRIMARY	JUNIOR SECONDARY
Gross enrollment rate	104	49
Net enrollment rate	88	34
Net intake ratio	78	18
Completion rate	57	41
Gender parity index	0.89	0.80

Source: Kaduna State Bureau of Statistics, 2016.

TABLE 5: KADUNA STATE BUDGET (IN MILLIONS OF NAIRA)

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total education budget from state (million \$US)	24,037 (\$66)	29,392 (\$81)	30,444 (\$84)	37,439 (\$103)
Personnel budget (% of total)	10,034 (41%)	14,531 (49%)	13,465 (44%)	13,814 (37%)
Overhead budget (% of total)	2,866 (12%)	3,363 (11%)	4,211 (14%)	4,564 (12%)
Capital budget (% of total)	11,135 (46%)	11,497 (39%)	12,766 (42%)	19,059 (51%)
Education share of total state budget (%)	18%	18%	17%	19%

Source: Kaduna State Government, 2014

TEACHER WORKFORCE

According to the Kaduna State 2014 Education Sector Performance Report, the average pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) at the primary level improved slightly from 33:1 in 2012 to 32:1 in 2013. In junior secondary schools, the PTR improved from 33:1 in 2012 to 28:1 in 2013. There are a total of 59,503 teachers in basic education, 34,004 of which work in primary public schools and 5,851 in junior secondary schools. An additional 19,652 teachers work in non-state schools (Kaduna State Government, 2014).

Many teachers in this workforce, however, were found to be unqualified. An audit and assessment of public school teachers in Kaduna State found that of a total of 43,696 teachers surveyed, 27 percent (of which 25 percent were primary school teachers and 2 percent were secondary school teachers) did not possess the minimum required qualification of the Nigeria Certificate in Education (NCE Kaduna State Government, 2015). More recently, the state government said that thousands of primary school teachers are to be fired after failing the exams set at the fourth-grade level. Governor Nasir El-Rufai said 21,780 teachers out of 33,000 (66 percent) had failed to score 75 percent or higher on assessments given to pupils (BBC News, 2017). In response, teacher unions and the Nigeria Labour Congress have promised to fight the governor's decision. The governor's plan to fire the teachers has already sparked

violent street protests, which will further intensify if the government implements the governor’s decision (Ishiekwene, 2017).

Gidan Waya College of Education is the official state teacher training institution and has prime responsibility for producing teachers for Kaduna. Other institutions, both federal and state, also train teachers who are then employed within the state (ESSPIN, 2009), including the National Teachers’ Institute, the Institute of Education at Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, and the Jama’at College. All of these teacher training institutions offer the NCE.

CONFLICT

The nature of conflict and violence in Kaduna state is complex and multifaceted. The state has been subject to various types of conflict, including election-related conflict as well as religious, communal, gender, tribal, and ethnic violence (Coinco, 2014). There is a complex interplay between these forms of violence that often overlap and are easily triggered due to long-standing, deeply rooted mistrust (ESSPIN, 2014a). As a result, conflict and violence in Kaduna is seen to be in a chronic and latent state. Analysis conducted by the Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN), a large multi-year engagement program sponsored by DFID, found that inadequately addressed legacies of violence in Kaduna have resulted in an ethno-religious divide in the state, where people are quick to retreat for safety and protection.

Ethno-religious communal violence in Kaduna can be traced to access to power, resources, land, and livelihood. Political violence ignites long-standing religious and communal conflicts, which leads to violent conflicts. For example, after the presidential election in 2011, riots that started in Kafanchan and Zaria rapidly deteriorated from political conflict to a widespread, violent religious conflict resulting in casualties, deaths, and the destruction and loss of houses and businesses (Coinco, 2014).

In Kafanchan, field reports indicated that the occurrence of “silent killings” between Christians and Muslims have created deep divisions in the community.⁵ Kaduna is also enmeshed in deadly violence between herdsman and farming communities. Attacks by Fulani herdsmen (mainly Muslim) on farming communities (mainly Christian) and their subsequent reprisals have ravaged Southern Kaduna. The conflict has escalated as more cattle herders move south, oftentimes entering farming land. Farmers accuse the Fulani herdsmen of allowing their cattle to trample and eat their crops. Fulani cattle herders accuse the farmers of killing their cattle (SBM Intelligence, 2017). It is important to note that this herder-farmer conflict pervades Northern Nigeria and is not exclusive to Kaduna (DFID, 2016).

Religious violence in Kaduna is not only between Muslims and Christians. A recent clash between the military and the Shiite Islamic group in Zaria, Kaduna resulted in the death of the three sons of a Shiite leader. This event has brought fear of revenge attacks and uncertainty in the community. (Coinco, 2014)

EFFECTS OF CONFLICT ON EDUCATION

The backdrop of violence and insecurity has contributed to an environment of fear and distrust, fueled by religious conflict. Insecurity and displacement affect households’ access to education and trust in state

⁵ Silent killings are said to occur in the evenings where groups of armed men enter homes and kill people in their sleep (Coinco, 2014).

and community actors and the willingness of parents to send children to school. These dynamics are further complicated by the fact that non-state education in Kaduna is principally religious in nature.

Education—and specifically religious education—can have an important impact in mitigating the effects of conflict and violence. However, education is inherently non-neutral, which is even more true for religious education. It can exacerbate strained religious, ethnic, and community relationships and propagate exclusionary or non-tolerant ideologies. The combination of Kaduna’s expansive, and principally religious, non-state education sector and the historic legacies of conflict has made education not only a victim of conflict but also a driver of conflict.

According to an in-depth study of conflict dynamics in Kaduna, Coinco (2014) found that the high prices for basic commodities such as school fees and unemployment create a sense of marginalization, frustration, and powerlessness for many—sentiments that can easily be channeled into violence. Government officials and donor partners also fear that radical Ma’alams (teachers of non-formal Islamic schools called Tsangayas) may turn students into agents of violence. Teacher strikes against government policies and delays in salary disbursements have caused violence (Coinco, 2014).


Education in Kaduna has been targeted for various reasons, including opposition to an education system perceived to be imposed by “outsiders” and one that promotes foreign values, and as a tactical way to spread fear and submission (Coinco, 2014). The immediate impact of violence and conflict in Kaduna includes school closures, destruction of or damage to school infrastructures and materials, and decreases in school supervision and inspections. Schools in Kaduna State have also been used to accommodate IDP who have fled violence in neighboring Bauchi and Plateau states. The same Coinco (2014) study found that the longer-term impact of violence and conflict to children’s education is the migration of pupils and teachers to safer communities, the increased number of dropouts, and the associated lower learning outcomes.

V. MAPPING

Several organizations are responsible for delivering education in Kaduna State, including the State Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (SMoE), the Local Government Area (LGA) Councils, and a variety of agencies and parastatals. These organizations share responsibilities, making planning, implementation, and accountability complicated. School inspection is performed at all levels but with overlapping responsibilities.

The SMoE is supplemented by four agencies: the SUBEB, the Agency for Mass Literacy, the Private Schools Board, and the Bureau of Religious Affairs. These corporate bodies are charged either with a statewide education sub-sector or sub function or with the management of a particular institution. They have considerable overlap regarding the responsibilities of the non-state schools and enjoy a certain level of autonomy.

FIGURE I. MAP OF KEY STATE AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR NON-STATE SCHOOLS IN KADUNA



1. **The Kaduna State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB)** – SUBEB’s core mandate is the management of primary and junior secondary schools in Kaduna State. The key functions of SUBEB are the recruitment and management of staff; disbursement of funds to schools; maintenance; rehabilitation of classrooms, schools, and other infrastructure; and purchase and distribution of infrastructure materials.
2. **State Agency for Mass Literacy (SAME)** – SAME is responsible for the eradication of illiteracy among population groups that have not benefited from primary education. It is mandated to provide avenues for vocational and adult literacy programs to those outside the formal school system. One of its key functions is to plan, implement, control, and monitor adult and non-formal education activities. As a result, SAME has areas of overlap with the Kaduna State Private Sector Board.

3. **Kaduna State Private Sector Board (PSB)** – The stipulated functions of PSB are to (1) monitor and regulate activities of private schools, (2) process applications for establishing private schools, and (3) register private institutions. The PSB’s key function includes keeping statistical records on all private schools, regulating fee levels of all private schools in the state, and registering private schools according to categories (e.g., nursery, basic, primary, and junior secondary).
4. **Bureau of Religious Affairs, Office of Executive Governor** – The Bureau of Religious Affairs primary mandates are to promote religious understanding and harmony and to coordinate Muslim pilgrimage matters in Kaduna State. Part of the bureau’s key function is to monitor religious bodies, including Islamic schools. As a result, the bureau registers non-integrated Islamic schools and believes that it should be screening teachers of Islamic religious studies. The constitution designates that the state has responsibility for education provision, but it allows parents to choose the type of education they desire for their children. Consequently, a variety of education modalities beyond strictly SUBEB-provided formal schools has proliferated in both the formal and non-formal sectors.

AFFORDABLE NON-STATE SCHOOLS

Based on the mapping exercise, non-state schools in Kaduna fall into three broad categories:

1. Non-Islamic (usually Christian)
2. Islamic
3. Integrated Islamic schools

It is important to note that there is variation in the typologies used by government and donors to describe non-state schools. This study found that traditional low-fee private schools, which are common in Lagos and other parts of South Nigeria, are mostly absent in Kaduna. Instead, ANSS are predominantly religiously affiliated in Kaduna. The PSB does not have a clear typology for non-state schools. Their registry of private schools includes elite schools, Christian/missionary schools, and integrated Islamiyyah schools. Non-integrated Islamic schools are not considered private and are defined as religious. The result is a lack of understanding of the exact prevalence of non-state schools.

Consequently, there are various estimates of the size of the non-state sector. According to Kaduna State government officials, there are 2,240 registered private schools in Kaduna State. Officials estimate that an additional 2,000 unregistered non-state schools operate in complete isolation of the government. However, this figure does not include non-formal Tsangaya schools, which government officials estimate at more than 6,000 in Kaduna. Of the 6,000 Tsangaya schools, only one-tenth of these schools are accounted for by the Bureau of Religious Affairs. Kaduna State’s Annual School Census Report 2015/16 estimates that there are 925 private schools at the primary level, representing 15 percent of the total schools in Kaduna. The General Household Survey shows that in Kaduna State, nearly 18 percent of students are enrolled in non-state schools. These figures should be interpreted with caution, however, as they are drawn from estimates and various definitions of what is considered a non-state school. The following sections describe the three types of non-state schools in detail.

NON-ISLAMIC SCHOOLS

Non-Islamic schools can be secular or Christian. Missionary schools provided much of the first formal education available in Nigeria during the colonization period. While it spread throughout southern Nigeria, northern Nigeria resisted most of the Christian-based missionary schools. In Kaduna, however, Christian schools were able to develop a foothold in the non-state sector as a schooling option for the 20 to 50 percent of the Kaduna population that was Christian (from information based on interviews with government officials). Through interviews, key informants have confirmed the prevalence of Christian and missionary schools in Kaduna. However, there are almost no official statistics on the pervasiveness of Christian schools and no data on enrollment, attendance, or quality. It should be noted that most of the Christian schools are often considered private schools rather than religious schools in government data.

ISLAMIC SCHOOLS

The concept of education in northern Nigeria has historically been associated with the teaching of the Qur'an (Hiskett, 1975). When British colonization introduced formal schools, such initiatives came to be associated with proselytization and were resisted in the north, creating systemic differences in education in the north and the south, where the British-based structure was never fully embraced (Antoninis, 2014). Rejection of public education can explain the resurgence in community-based Islamic schools in the 1980s and 1990s, as state schools became “foreign islands—inaccessible and out of reach—to rural poor, migrant or nomadic children” (Antoninis, 2014). The widely held view is that the quality of education in public schools has deteriorated. As a result, parents in the north have switched back to a type of education “tailored to special needs of those with limited engagement with the state” (Baba, 2011). For many parents, the benefits of Islamic religious schools include proximity, informal organization, and community involvement.

In Kaduna, there are three broad types of Islamic schools: *Ilimi/Zaure*, *Islamiyyah*, and *Qur'anic*. These types of schools are also called IQTE (*Islamiyyah*, *Qur'anic*, and *Tsangaya*) schools. Descriptions of each of these three types of schools are provided below.

Ilimi/Zaure

Ilimi/Zaure are non-formal schools that provide an advanced track for specialized training in diverse fields of Islam. Unlike modern formal schools, *Ilimi* schools operate with an open-ended structure that allows each student to pursue an individual course of study. *Ilimi* schools teach through advanced discussions of the various meanings and implications of the Qur'an. Typically, the teacher will be seated on a mat surrounded by his students, who will take turns reading from their individual Arabic texts while the teacher gives interpretation and commentary in Hausa or Fulfulde. According to a study conducted by Umar (2003), “the core subjects in the curriculum of *Ilimi* schools comprise Qur'an exegesis (*tafsir*), Traditions of Prophet Muhammad (*hadith* and *sira*), Principles and Rules of Islamic Jurisprudence (*fiqh* and *usul al-fiq*), Theology (*Ilm al-tawhid*), Mysticism (*tasawwuf*), Arabic Language and Literature (*al-luggha* and *al-adab*), Mathematics (*al-hisab*), Medicine (*tibb*), and History (*tarikh*).” *Ilimi* schools cater to older students aged 15 years and above who seek specialization in Islamic studies.

Tsangaya or Qur'anic

The archetype of traditional Islamic education, Tsangaya schools are non-formal, mobile education institutions that revolve around the Ma'alam, a spiritual teacher who travels from place to place with a few students. These schools are sparse and resource-lean environments where children gather for lessons at the house of the Ma'alam, a mosque, under a tree, or in a community space. At these schools, children are taught to memorize the Qur'an through a combination of recitation and copying activities. Secular subjects are not taught. The typical school consists of students of varying ages, mostly males from about 7 to 20 years old. There are no formal tests in these schools. Students are free to attend or drop out, depending on their family's need for help with work around the home.

Tsangaya schools are popular in Kaduna for several reasons. These schools have flexible schedules, which are more appropriate for rural societies that rely solely on subsistence farming. According to Solomon (2015), "because these schools have multiple entry points—children can enroll in the schools at any time of the year provided they are in session—parents can schedule their child's school attendance around seasonal agricultural activities." This flexibility also allows students to progress at their own pace. In contrast, state schools have a single-entry point at the beginning of each academic year and a complex admission process that sometimes hinders enrollment (Solomon, 2015). Tsangaya schools' egalitarian outlook and affordability (schools do not charge fees or require payment for uniforms, texts, notebooks, meals, or transportation) are also extremely attractive to parents (Solomon, 2015).

Most of the children who attend Qur'anic and Tsangaya schools are Almajiri, children sent away from their homes by parents to learn the Qur'an. The Almajiri, when not memorizing the Qur'an, are sometimes told by their Ma'alam to roam the street and beg for food or money. These children constitute much of the official out-of-school population in Nigeria.

These poorly accommodated and under-funded schools have concerned the government. While still popular, skeptics view Qur'anic schools as no more than a breeding ground for street-beggars or for propagating extremist behavior. They argue that these under-regulated schools have increasingly failed to fulfill their traditional educational mission and generally do not give their pupils skills and knowledge necessary for functioning effectively in society. Aware of the problem, the federal government has invested heavily in building over 100 integrated Qur'anic/Tsangaya schools in the northern states. These schools will have a more modern curriculum so that students can get a traditional Qur'anic education alongside Western-style classes in reading, math, science, and vocational training (The Economist, 2014).

Islamiyyah

A significant number of Qur'anic schools in Nigeria have transformed into Islamiyyah schools by providing more than just basic memorization of the Qur'an. Islamiyyah schools were introduced in the 1950s, inspired by the approach taken by other Muslim countries in response to the challenge of secular schooling. Unlike Ilimi and Tsangaya schools, Islamiyyah schools follow a formal structure in terms of time schedules and approaches to teaching. Many have abandoned the old pedagogical techniques (improvised and offhand teaching) in favor of more formal, structured, and age-bracketed classes.

Islamiyyah schools are private, owned by individuals, communities or societies. They may be integrated or non-integrated. Non-integrated Islamiyyah schools do not offer secular subjects whereas integrated Islamiyyah schools do.

INTEGRATED ISLAMIC SCHOOLS

In Kaduna, the process of integrating Qur’anic, Tsangaya, and Islamiyyah schools into the Universal Basic Education (UBE) program was put in place in 2006 by the UBE Commission, the national agency responsible for providing quality universal basic education to all Nigerian children. After baseline surveys and a series of consultations with local and religious leaders, Kaduna began the formal process of integrating Islamic schools into the UBE program with support from ESSPIN. The strategy was implemented by the SUBEB.

The state integration strategy can be described as having five main intervention types. Table 6 summarizes the different integration strategies based on intervention and school management.

TABLE 6. INTEGRATION STRATEGIES FOR TSANGAYA SCHOOLS

INTERVENTION TYPE	SCHOOL MANAGEMENT	DESCRIPTION
Boarding	Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • These schools are currently in Birnin Gwari, Sabon Gari, and Kudan LGAs. • Schools are managed by the government through a memorandum of understanding between the state and federal governments. • The government provides support by constructing classrooms, hostels, toilets, kitchens, and staff quarters. • School feeding and school maintenance are handled by SUBEB. • Teaching, learning, and other support materials are provided by the government. • Teachers are recruited and posted by government. • Schools run two sections (basic education headed by a head teacher and the Tsangayya headed by Ma’alams). • Teacher salaries and allowances are paid by the government. • Curriculum is split between secular and Qur’anic subjects. • Ma’alams are not housed in the boarding school. • Boarding school students are Almajiris drawn from 23 LGAs.

TABLE 6. INTEGRATION STRATEGIES FOR TSANGAYA SCHOOLS

INTERVENTION TYPE	SCHOOL MANAGEMENT	DESCRIPTION
Day	Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • These schools are presently in two LGAs (Gakarko and Makarfi). • The schools target hard-to-reach children who are not in boarding or semi-boarding schools. • Schools are owned and managed by the government. • Schools are run every day of the week, covering basic education and Islamic subjects. • Government provides support by constructing classrooms, toilets, headmaster’s offices, and a community recitation hall. • These schools have no boarding facilities. • Teachers are recruited by government. • Salaries are paid to the government-recruited teachers but not to Ma’alams. • Curriculum is split between secular and Qur’anic subjects.
Semi-Boarding	Ma’alam	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • These schools are currently in five LGAs (Jemaa’a, Igabi, Soba, Lere, and Kubau) • Government provides support by constructing classrooms, hostels, and toilets. • Schools have no teacher staff quarters. • Schools have no Ma’alams quarters and kitchen. • Teaching, learning, and other support materials are provided by the government. • Teachers are recruited and posted by the government. • Schools run two sections (basic education headed by a head teacher and the Tsangayya headed by Ma’alams). • Teacher salaries and allowances are paid by the government, except for the Ma’alams. • Curriculum is split between secular and Qur’anic subjects. • Students are Almajiris of particular selected Ma’alams schools. • Government provides support by constructing a recitation hall, classrooms, hostels, and toilets. • The community supports the feeding of the Students. • Curriculum split between secular and Qur’anic subjects.

TABLE 6. INTEGRATION STRATEGIES FOR TSANGAYA SCHOOLS

INTERVENTION TYPE	SCHOOL MANAGEMENT	DESCRIPTION
Pilot	Ma'alam	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• These schools are currently in the 23 LGAs of Kaduna State and were carefully selected for the pilot.• Management of the schools by Ma'alams fully supported by the government.• Teaching and learning materials and other support materials provided by the government.• Teachers are recruited and posted by government.• Schools run two sections (basic education headed by a head teacher and the Tsangayya headed by Ma'alams).• Salaries for the teachers and head teachers and allowance for Ma'alams.• Curriculum is split between secular and Qur'anic subjects.• The schools are located with the Ma'alams.• Students are Almajiris, but they are largely orphans and other vulnerable groups.• No government support for the infrastructure or materials.
ESSPIN	Ma'alam	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Teachers are recruited by Ma'alam from community.• Volunteers teachers were mobilized, screened, and selected from the schools' community and trained by ESSPIN.• Monthly allowances are provided to the volunteers by ESSPIN.• Curriculum is split between secular and Qur'anic subjects.• Instructional and support materials are provided and distributed by ESSPIN.• Ma'alams were supported with a farming scheme program by ESSPIN.• Some of the Ma'alams that did not buy in to the farming scheme were provided with monthly allowance by ESSPIN.• Toward the end of the ESSPIN program to date, the government is providing instructional and support materials to the schools.

At the core of all five types of integration models is the introduction of SUBEB-recruited teachers to teach basic education subjects. Almost all of the teachers for the basic education subjects are recruited from LGA schools and paid by SUBEB.

VI. FINDINGS

The findings that emerged from key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and document review are grouped into four categories: (1) accountability; (2) access and inclusion; (3) quality, safety, and holistic well-being; and (4) finance and sustainability.

ACCOUNTABILITY

1. State authorities recognize the complementary role of non-state schools but are largely unaware of the specific needs and conditions of non-state schools, and they have not ensured that sufficient, good data are collected on non-state schools.

Government actors broadly agree that non-state schools play a significant gap-filling role in education. State actors were honest about the shortfalls of public education citing overcrowded classes, lack of space, and a general lack of accessibility to public schools. One government actor confessed, “parents go to non-state schools because there aren’t enough public schools. For some parents the nearest public schools aren’t close to their homes.”

Despite this recognition, government officials are largely unaware of the precise needs and conditions of non-state schools. This is due partly to the lack of robust data available on non-state schools. The Private School Board, which is in charge of registration, monitoring, and evaluation, have 34 field staff responsible for the inspection of 2,240 registered schools, a ratio of 1 staff member per 65 registered schools. The lack of funding and operational motorbikes for field staff to make school visits were cited as reasons for irregular data collection and incomplete data.

Moreover, government officials are only able to monitor registered schools. Government officials estimate that there are an additional 2,000 unregistered non-state schools in Kaduna that operate in complete isolation of the government. As mentioned, this figure does not include non-formal Tsangaya schools, which are estimated at more than 6,000 in Kaduna. Of the estimated 6,000 Tsangaya schools, only one-tenth of schools are accounted for by the Bureau of Religious Affairs.

2. State policies on registration, accreditation, and taxation of non-state schools are unclear and burdensome. The lack of a suitable regulatory environment discourages non-state schools from registering.

The registration and accreditation process in Kaduna has multiple phases and criteria that are unclear and time consuming for most non-state schools (Box 1). Of the nine sampled non-state schools, only three were registered with the Private Schools Board (PSB).

Box I. School accreditation process in Kaduna State

To operate legally, non-state schools must be accredited by the PSB, which sits within the Kaduna State Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. Accreditation involves the following stages:

- The proprietor applies to the PSB and pays an application fee.
- PSB issues a form along with a copy of the minimum standards for the establishment of the school.
- PSB officials inspect the site:
 - If the site is consistent with the guidelines, a provisional approval is given, and the school is categorized (A – E) by level of income and standard of infrastructure.
 - If the site is not consistent with the guidelines, the proprietor is advised to comply with the guidelines or stop further development. The proprietor can ask for re-inspection whenever ready.
- Officials from the Ministry of Education carry out a “Recognition Inspection” of the school. A letter of approval is issued if the school meets all the guidelines.

Once accredited, non-state schools are expected to follow the state’s school calendar, hours of operation, curriculum, and minimum qualification and wage requirements for teachers. Regular school visits are conducted by the PSB to make sure the school continues to adhere to guidelines.

Accreditation of Islamic non-integrated schools is sanctioned by the Bureau for Religious Affairs, Islamic Matters Office of Executive Governor. The Islamic school sends an application form, endorsed by district village heads and the LGA Health Department and District Office, to the Bureau of Religious Affairs. The application is reviewed by the bureau to make sure the school meets minimum standards. Once approved, the bureau sends an acknowledgement and introduction to the school. No fee is paid for accreditation.

All three registered schools stated that the multiple government taxes were a heavy burden on their finances. The largest of these fees is the annual re-accreditation fee, which can range from \$97 to over \$556. The fee is dependent on the school’s categorization, such that class A schools are taxed higher than class E schools.⁶ In addition to the annual re-accreditation fee, schools are subject to various fees that are not consistently applied by the government and are not clearly understood by all schools. Head teachers and school directors gave inconsistent statements as to the types of fees they were charged. These included a local government tax, land rental fees, commerce, industry, and appropriate signage fees.

Officials from the PSB acknowledged that multiple government taxation was hurting non-state schools. State officials also revealed that the long accreditation process and the subsequent taxation policies discourage non-state schools from registering. For some schools, it is better to operate independently and forgo paying taxes even though school accreditation is highly valued by parents.

⁶ Non-state schools are categorized by level of income and standard of infrastructure. There are five levels of classification. Class A schools are deemed to have the highest income and better infrastructure standards than Class E schools.

Head teachers suggested that government taxes codes should be waived for low-income schools, which would give schools more money for teacher salaries, investments in infrastructure, or scholarships. When asked what services or support they received from the government in return, school representatives universally responded that they had received no support.

Non-integrated Islamiyyah and Tsangaya schools can also opt to register with the Bureau of Religious Affairs, the government parastatal mandated, among other things, to coordinate and regulate Islamic religious education institutions. Non-integrated Tsangayas are not considered formal schools and are not registered by the PSB.

It is important to note that environments where policies are unclear can lead to corruption. Although the research team did not find evidence of corruption, one headmaster implied a common malpractice by revealing that he keeps all tax receipts “because government officials always come back looking to charge yet another fee.”

TABLE 7: PHYSICAL FACILITIES MINIMUM GUIDELINES:

DESCRIPTION	GUIDELINE
Land with certificate of occupancy	4 hectares
Dimensions of classrooms	9 m x 6.6 m
Class size at inception	Maximum of 49
Administrative block	1 block
Library	1 functional library
Basic health scheme	First-aid room
Toilet facilities	1 with toilet bowl/urinal
Games field	1 football field

Source: Afemikhe Omo-Egbekuse, & Imobekhai, 2009

TABLE 8: HUMAN RESOURCES MINIMUM GUIDELINES:

DESCRIPTION	GUIDELINE
Qualification of head teacher	NCE primary education
Teacher qualification	TC II, NCE primary education
Minimum number of teachers	1 teacher to 20 students, minimum ratio

Source: Afemikhe et al., 2009

3. Non-state schools are deeply rooted in their local communities. As a result, parents, teachers, and headmasters are extensively involved in ensuring the well-being of the school.

Islamic schools, whether Islamiyyah or Tsangaya, are deeply rooted in their local communities. Parents describe non-state schools as family, where relationships between teachers, parents, and headmasters extend beyond school walls. As a result, non-state schools are often managed by the community or have an active parent-teacher association (PTA) involved in school operations and decisionmaking (such as raising school fees). Major decisions are only made if there is agreement between parents and the school. “Whatever we do, we do it in consultation with the parents,” explained one school’s head teacher. Non-state schools are also supported and consulted by traditional and religious local leaders.

Beyond school management, schools receive in-kind or financial support from the local communities. Parents provide material goods, such as mats, chalk, and teaching materials; give monetary donations; or offer services, such as volunteer support for school feeding. Wealthy community members provide donations as part of the Islamic practice of *Waqf*. For Islamic schools, these donations are a crucial source of revenue without which they would struggle to stay afloat. Of all non-state school types, Tsangayas are the most dependent on community support for subsistence farming, school feeding, and monetary or material donations.

The two Christian schools are also anchored to the local communities with large Christian populations. The Anglican Church School is located in the city center, which attracts businesses and traders from South Kaduna. The Christian school in Jemma’a is in a predominantly Christian area. Unlike Islamic schools, Christian schools are often affiliated with a church that can financially support the school. Therefore, there is less need for Christian schools to actively engage with communities to seek donations or do fund raising.



The research team conducting interviews with Ma’alams (teachers) in a non-integrated Tsangaya in Unguwan Zaria, Kaduna State.
JAMILU MUSA

4. Tsangayas are willing to partner with the state authorities and to integrate basic education in their curricula. However, they are disappointed by the lack of commitment shown by the state government in engaging meaningfully with the non-state sector.

Kaduna State has benefitted from two pilots to integrate basic education into religious non-state schools. The federal government integration scheme, which started in 2006, sought to build integrated Tsangaya schools around the country to address the growing Almajiri and out-of-school populations. However, this government integration program is widely seen as a “white-elephant” project.

The second pilot was part of the Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN), a large multi-year engagement program sponsored by DFID. Following its success at Kano State, ESSPIN moved into Kaduna to replicate the Islamiyyah, Qur’anic, and Tsangaya education (IQTE) integration program. The program’s success was built on sensitizing communities on the merits of basic education and explaining that integrating a basic education curriculum into an Islamic school did not mean removing the religious component of the school.

Due to these pilots and various other efforts, Ma’alams and communities have come to accept and acknowledge the importance of basic education. However, the end of ESSPIN and the government’s failure to sustain the pilot integration programs have frustrated Ma’alams and communities that had embraced the concept of integration. As a result, an opportunity may have been missed to build on the momentum generated by past efforts. Communities may be disillusioned by future attempts to integrate schools and may associate their disillusionment to the concept of integration rather than to the government and donor failure to sustain the integration programs.

ACCESS AND INCLUSION

5. Reflecting the localized and faith-based nature of non-state schools, their student bodies are largely of the same religion or tribe.

Although non-state schools do not actively set entry requirements for children from different ethnic or religious backgrounds, the self-selection bias of parents can cause exclusive rather than inclusive student bodies. For example, Islamiyyah schools rarely had Christian students. “There are no Christians here, but we would welcome them,” said one headmaster of an integrated Islamiyyah school. Another proprietor was more outright in their assessments, “This is the nature of our society. Only Muslim parents would choose to send their child to this school, even though we welcome Christians.” As one donor described it, “religious education divides across religious lines, which undermines community resilience.”

State inspectors of non-state schools find that most private schools are established on tribe, religion, or ethnicity and cater specifically to students of the same tribe, ethnic, or religious background. Government officials expressed some grievance about segregation in non-state schools, stating that education needs to be accessible to all children and cannot be divided along religious or tribal affiliations.

We found that the integration of a basic education curriculum in faith-based schools helped to overcome the perception that religious schools only cater to students from the same religion or tribe. Integrated Islamiyyah schools actively sought non-Muslims. “All children are welcome here” and “we are open to all, regardless of tribe” were mentioned by teachers and headmasters. Muslim parents are more likely to send their children to a Christian or missionary school that provides basic education than are Christian parents to send their children to Islamic schools. The two Christian schools in our sample had the most diverse student bodies. The inclusion of basic education curriculum helps parents understand that providing a quality education is often the main goal of non-state schools, not proselyting.



Parents explaining to the research team reasons for choosing a Tsangaya for their children.

JAMILU MUSA

6. Enrollment in affordable non-state schools is driven not only by religion but also by the perceived quality of a “values” education and by school location.

Non-states schools, whether affordable nor not, are almost universally preferred to secular state schools. All parents who send their children to Islamic non-state schools disclosed that their primary motivation for doing so was because the school provides an Islamic education. State schools, which are secular and fee-free, do not teach Islam or any other religion. Cultural affiliations of communities to specific religious schools motivate parents to keep their children in such schools even if they must pay higher fees. This affiliation to religious teaching is closely linked to the desire for a values education, where children are taught discipline and respect for elders and are given lessons on proper ethics. The importance of learning the Qur’an is particularly important to parents of children attending Tsangaya schools.

Formal non-state schools are perceived to be of better quality than state schools. Parents unanimously assert that teaching standards are better in private schools than state schools. Teachers pay closer attention to students, rarely miss classes, and are better supervised by the headmaster. Parents emphasize that public school teachers are neither punctual nor committed. We were told that public

school teachers would often leave the school by 2 p.m., whereas private school teachers would stay until the end of the school session. It is a common perception that students from state schools are rowdy and not disciplined.

School location is an additional factor linked to school choice. Parents prefer schools located close to their homes. This demand is linked closely to safety. Unlike public schools, formal non-state schools are preferred because they are fenced and usually have a security guard.

Finally, it is important to note that for all parents, even those sending their children to non-integrated schools, an integrated approach to education is very appealing. Parents recognize the benefit of basic education and see the integrated approach as an education model that provides them with the best of both worlds: a modern education necessary for a skills-driven economy with an accompanying curriculum that instills religious principles.

QUALITY, SECURITY, AND STUDENT WELL-BEING

7. Conflict and violence affect non-state schools in a variety of diverse ways, including the suspension of classes and the loss of infrastructure. Enrollment and attendance rates decrease as parents relocate away from violence-torn locations.

Not all sample schools were affected by conflict. Those that experienced violence or civil unrest were affected in a variety of ways. Civil unrest and incidences of violence forced schools to suspend classes. The amount of time schools suspended classes ranged from a few days to four weeks. School closures were sometimes enforced by government curfew. Even when classes resumed, some parents chose to keep their children at home for a few extra days. According to teachers, the performance of students drop as a result of missing school. Other anecdotes include the destruction of infrastructure and incidences of school vandalism.

In the medium to long term, attendance and enrollment rates decrease. Parents relocate out of fear of being targeted for their religion, ethnicity, or tribe. The migration of families adds to the growing homogenization of student bodies. Religious, tribal, or ethnic-based civil unrest or violence exacerbates the already segregated nature of non-state schools. According to one respondent, “Parents with different beliefs don’t want children to attend other school with different perceptions.” A bomb blast near Christ Church school, where the population is predominantly Muslim, triggered many Christians to relocate to South Kaduna. As a result, the school lost 400 students. When asked what were some of the reasons behind drop-out rates, teachers included conflict as a reason. Teachers from an integrated Islamiyyah said that “for every ten students, four transfer to other schools because of conflict.”

8. Non-state schools can respond proactively to conflict or imminent violence because they are rooted in their community network.

Non-state schools are not immune to conflict. However, Islamic non-state schools that are endorsed by local religious leaders enjoy an added level of respect and legitimacy that can protect them from violence. Parents and teachers believe that non-state schools provide a safer environment than public schools. Religious and local leaders are able to warn schools of imminent conflict, which enables schools to plan and prepare. As opposed to public schools, formal non-state schools are also fenced or walled, which significantly improves safety. Some schools hire security guards to improve safety.

Donors held the same belief that state schools were more vulnerable to conflict than non-state schools. Studies conducted by donors working in the northeast geo-political zone of Nigeria found that because non-state schools were so deeply rooted within the communities, they were less prone to direct violent attacks, unlike public schools. One donor explained that a major grievance in northeastern Nigeria is the perceived correlation between secular “Western” education and corruption, exclusion, and class division. Because non-state schools exhibit less of these traits and predominantly focus on Islamic values, they are better insulated from violent attack than state schools.

This link between community and resilience is not clearly understood by government and other state actors working in education. Community vigilance helps protect schools from violence. Donors also agreed that school fencing, absent from public schools, improved security. Although the incidence did not take place in Kaduna, the kidnapping of the Chibok girls by Boko Harm, was presented by an NGO stakeholder as an example of how public schools without fencing were vulnerable to attack.⁷

9. Religious non-state schools have a platform to incorporate peacebuilding and civic engagement in school curriculums, but there is also fear within the government that unregulated schools can influence violent or extremist behavior.

Only a few schools reported that they provide counseling or psychosocial support to students. These schools provide counselling to married girls dealing with marital issues as well as moderate support to children who are grieving the loss of a parent. Beyond this, the concept of psychosocial support for children affected by conflict or violence was not understood. Teachers were aware, however, of certain students who displayed signs of distress, such as wetting themselves and jerking in response to loud noises. These teachers also said they were unsure of how to counsel these students.

Religious non-state schools, however, were found to teach good citizenship, respect for others, and morality—subjects closely linked with teachings from the Qur’an and other religious scripts. This provides a clear platform to further incorporate peace-building and peace education courses into school curricula. Integrated non-state schools also teach civic engagement and social studies, subjects that are part of the national basic education curriculum.

On the other hand, there is the perception among certain government officials that Tsangaya schools can influence violent or extremist behavior. One government official expressed sadness and fear for the Almajiri by saying “most of these children lack parental care and charity. As a result, they later transform into criminals or agents of violence in society.” The potential “radicalization” of Almajiri is blamed on fundamentalist Ma’alams and the poor quality of education in non-integrated Tsangayas.

It is important to note that we did not find ethnic-religious tension or conflict between ANSS and government schools or inside ANSS. Further, this study did not encounter evidence to suggest the potential radicalization of Almajiri in Tsangayas. There seems to be less resistance from Ma’alams on introducing “Western education” in Tsangaya schools than previously thought. All respondents accepted that children need to learn basic skills.

⁷ It is important to note that the Chibok girls were Christian and Muslim and were kidnapped from a government secondary boarding school.

10. Non-state schools struggle financially to provide meals to students, which is an important consideration of school choice for parents.

All sampled schools sought government, donor, or community support to start or sustain feeding programs. School feeding programs are often expensive to sustain, requiring support from PTAs to help provide resources or support in cooking. According to one head teacher, the school feeding program accounts for the largest operational expense of the school aside from salaries. Feeding programs are more difficult to operate in times of conflict when students are more likely to come to school hungry.

For Tsangaya schools, the task of feeding children is linked to begging. The Almajiri, when not in class, have a reputation for hawking. To quell street begging, Kaduna has implemented a new policy banning the practice. In return, Ma'alams receive vocational training and farming assistance. Frustrated Ma'alams, however, noted that although the begging policy was implemented, the government had failed to provide them with the promised assistance.

In Kaduna where food security is an issue, schools that have feeding programs are viewed favorably by parents. Although we did not find clear evidence of attribution, headmasters from our sampled schools believe the decreasing enrollment and attendance rates in non-state schools have been partially influenced by public-school feeding programs. Parents have found the Kaduna state government feeding program in public schools, introduced at the beginning of this year, enticing. It is important to note that donors view the public school-feeding program as a disaster as it was not planned in conjunction with the Ministry of Education or local governments. The program is expected to face serious financial constraints with the State government and have already requested financial support from donors.

EDUCATION FINANCING AND SUSTAINABILITY

11. The cost to households of sending children to non-state schools varies according to school type.

There are few data sources on the household costs of education in Kaduna State. Among these few is the General Household Survey Panel (GHSP) 2012-2013, a nationally representative survey that provides broad insights on the household cost of education in Nigeria, including Kaduna. Analysis by the World Bank revealed that religious non-state schools in Nigeria tend to be more accessible than secular private schools, having overall lower unit costs, which at times are even lower than public school unit cost. Enrollment in the religious schools tends to be slightly higher among children from poor families. Likewise, enrollment in public schools tends to accommodate children from poorer families at the basic education level. Poor families tend to be associated with larger family sizes, increasing the share of children from the poorer families using public services. Religious schools and public schools are important providers for the poor.

The analysis from the World Bank reveals that “children from the poorest households and from northern states face a significant resource shortage compared with children from affluent families and from southern states regardless of the type of school they attend (public, private and religious).” It is important to note that the GHSP defines religious providers as Islamic schools that are either Qur’anic, Islamiyyah, or Tsangaya. Private schools include Christian schools, elite schools, and the low-fee private schools commonly found in Southern Nigeria.

Although system-level data on school affordability are not available, qualitative data suggest that Christian schools may not be affordable to the lowest-income families and that Tsangaya schools are essentially the most affordable of schools but have the lowest levels of quality.

**I2. Affordable non-state schools are generally not profit-driven and are not profitable.
Non-state schools depend on monetary or in-kind donations from the community for financial sustainability.**

Many private schools are established by teachers, charitable individuals, or religious groups. All sampled schools were established with a social, not-for-profit mission. The driving motivation for many of these schools is to provide a quality education that is associated with religious values and traditions. While system-level data on school profitability are not available, school directors included in this study stated that their schools were not profitable and that they were perpetually short on funds. Head teachers of Islamiyyah schools described how their schools would shut down if it were not for donations received by wealthy individuals during the *Jummat*, *Sallat*, and other religious services. Sometimes they delay paying teacher salaries because of resource shortages. Schools are rarely closed because of quality issues; they are much more likely to shut down because of financial insolvency.

School fees are the primary source of school revenue, and teacher salaries and all other expenses depend on their regular receipt. Schools may be flexible, out of a sense of communal goodwill, when families are temporarily unable to pay school fees; however, missed fees translate into decreased financial liquidity. School sustainability depends on minimizing other costs, including infrastructure investment, staff numbers, and teacher pay. At such low fee levels, schools are vulnerable to financial shocks and are unable to make investments that may allow for or attract additional enrollment. Head teachers stated that any attempt to increase school fees would be obstructed by parents.

School proprietors are cognizant of the resource constraints faced by low-income families and have to “accept that some parents won’t pay in time.” Headmasters also offer flexible payment schemes by allowing parents to pay school fees in installments rather than at the beginning of each term. However, the inconsistent revenue flows affect teacher salary payments, which get delayed as a result.

Of all samples schools, Tsangayas operate in the most precarious financial circumstances. Tsangayas charge zero or minimal fees and rely heavily on subsistence farming, community support, and informal business services. Tsangayas often farm on public land for food that is shared with teachers and students. For example, Ma’alams interviewed explained that they offered tailoring or shoe polishing services in order to generate income. Ma’alams at Tsangayas are not paid.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of common-sense reforms and interventions could improve the quality of education offered by non-state schools without necessarily diverting resources from public to private schools. Additionally, there are modalities through which investment in non-state schools could augment resilience to violence and access to education. Based on the full set of findings from this study, we present several recommendations for action that government and donors could take to support the Kaduna State education system. These recommendations have at their foundation an understanding that a large proportion of non-state schools serve low-income populations, and private and public sectors are inexorably interrelated, face similar challenges, and would benefit from closer collaboration. Recommendations are presented by actor type.

KADUNA STATE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

- 1. Conduct regular surveys and needs assessments of non-state schools.** The state government is generally unaware of the status of non-state schools and is unclear of their exact needs and challenges. This handicaps the Ministry in developing evidence-based policies and causes stigmatization of private schools. To strengthen the capacity for evidence-based decisionmaking, data quality needs to be drastically improved, planned surveys need to be funded, and needs assessments need to be conducted to help identify the bottlenecks that non-state schools face, particularly in contexts of conflict.
- 2. Introduce clear and streamlined criteria and processes for registering, accrediting, and regulating non-state schools.** The registration criteria for new schools should be designed so that they do not unduly restrict the entry of new institutions or create disincentives to register. The accreditation process should be streamlined and based on clear criteria. Regulation of non-state schools should be systematic; quality indicators should be objective and measurable so as to minimize discretion and limit the scope for corruption.
- 3. Reduce the tax burden on non-state schools.** All accredited non-state schools are subject to multiple taxes that exacerbate financial fragility and stifle growth. Tax exemptions could be granted for non-state schools under a certain size, income level, or during the start-up phase. Taxes on ANSS need to be harmonized, simplified, or removed all together. Government goals for educating children would be better served by collecting revenue from other sources, not schools.
- 4. Commit to the integration of Islamic non-state schools.** This study found no evidence to suggest Islamic non-state schools are opposed to the integration of a basic education curriculum. The government, therefore, has an opportunity to build on this sensitization by sustaining integration programs initiated by donors and paying the salaries of state teachers currently integrated into non-state schools.
- 5. Provide incentives and subsidies for non-state schools.** All sampled schools expressed interest and willingness to partner with the government to improve school quality, financial standing, and accessibility. In turn, the government could support non-state schools by (1) allowing private schools teachers no-cost access to in-service trainings at national teacher colleges, (2) expanding the government school feeding program mandate to non-state schools, (3) providing government

standard textbooks and other teaching and learning materials, and (4) paying for teacher positions in schools serving low-income populations or those operating in violence-affected areas.

DONORS

- 6. Adjust their sector engagement strategies to pay more attention to non-state schools or at least to recognize the vital role that they play.** Given the prevalence of non-state schools, any strategy that does not acknowledge that reality is incomplete. Donor activities should explore engagements with non-state schools as a means of building resilience and peace and supporting marginalized communities. Engagements could include providing state teachers to non-state schools to teach the basic education curriculum. Research on state education should also take into account non-state schools, as these schools form an important part of the sector.
- 7. Assist the Kaduna State government in clarifying their policies toward non-state schools.** Successful design and implementation of policies toward the non-state sector needs to ensure that the government agency responsible for regulating the private sector has both the information and skills required to create, develop, and manage functions, such as institutional accreditation/registration, quality assurance processes, and monitoring. Donors can play an important complementary role in supporting government to develop data-driven policies toward non-state schools and help create enabling and balanced regulatory frameworks.
- 8. Support the government to fund surveys and censuses on non-state schools.** Surveys and censuses can be costly projects for governments to conduct independently. Donors can partner with state agencies in the design, implementation, analysis, and funding of surveys, censuses, and other research projects.

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IX. ANNEX

INFORMANTS INCLUDED IN STUDY

INFORMANT GROUP	INFORMANTS
Donors	USAID DFID Creative International Islamic Development Bank FHI 360 Plan International Mercy Corps International Rescue Committee
Kaduna State Ministry of Education	State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB) Private Schools Board Implementation Committee on IQTE
NGO/CSO	State Chapter of Qur'anic Ma'alams Millennium Hope Tsangaya School Civil Society Action Coalition Education for All (CSACEFA) Federation of Muslim Women in Nigeria (FOMWAN)